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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS ] 
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vs. ] 
DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and ] 
RENAE GRIFFIN, ] 
Appellees/Defendants. ] 
DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and ] 
RENAE GRIFFIN, ] 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, ) 
VS. j 
MARCUS BARNEY, HEATHER ] 
BARNEY, RICK C. FARR, TONIC. ; 
FARR, CLAUDE (RICK) FARR JR., ; 
ANDREW STEVEN WILSON, ] 
CHARLES CAMPBELL, ; 
OAK LANE ASSOCIATES, and ] 
THE OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS' ; 
ASSOCIATION, ] 
Counterclaim Defendants. ] 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE STRICKEN DEDICATORY LANGUAGE ON THE PLAT RAISES THE 
INHERENTLY FACTUAL ISSUE OF INTENT WHICH IS AN 
INAPPROPRIATE DETERMINATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In ih&h Brief ofAppettee[s], the Griffins address the stricken dedicatory language 
on the plat by arguing that the developers "clearly" wanted-i.e. intended-Oak Lane to be a 
common-use private lane under the 1976 Ordinance. The Griffins base this argument on 
certain requirements from Chapter in, Supplemental and Qualifying Regulations, of the 
1976 Ordinance. [R. 245-46.] The Griffins then extrapolate, without any factual foundation, 
that "the lane was designed in the plat map . . ." according to the various requirements in 
Chapter IE of the 1976 Ordinance. The Griffins conclude that because these requirements 
are included in Chapter IE of the 1976 Ordinance, and assuming the subdivision was built as 
per these requirements (although no facts support this assumption), the developers must 
have intended Oak Lane to be a common-use private lane. The Griffins also support their 
intent argument by asserting, "The intent of the developers is further manifest" by 
appearing on January 3,1977 at the Alpine City Council meeting to discuss Oak Lane. 
The Griffins thus attempt to distinguish the stricken language on the plat map by 
divining the developers' intent based on requirements in the 1976 Ordinance and an 
enigmatic city council minute reference to a discussion about Oak Lane. The Griffins (and 
the trial court), however, err in making this intent argument because they forget that with 
summary judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented are to be 
construed in favor of the non-movants (i.e. the Association): "If there is any doubt or 
1 
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
opposing party [and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment." Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). The Griffins' intent 
argument is basically, 'on one hand you might have the stricken dedicatory language, but on 
the other hand you have the 1976 Ordinance and a minute entry; weighing the two indicates 
the developers' intent was to have a common-use private lane.' Such weighing of evidence 
in favor of the Griffins violates the summary judgment standard. 
Further, in arguing what the developers' intent was, the Griffins argue an inherently 
factual issue. "The intent of the parties is a factual determination." Jarman v. Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising Co.. 794 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1990). See also, WebBank v. American 
General Annuity Service Corp.. 54 P.3d 1139,1147 (Utah 2002) (holding, "Because the 
grant of summary judgment was improper due to the existence of a disputed factual issue as 
to WebBank!s and Soliz's intentions . . . , " the court reversed the trial court's summary 
judgment award); Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 
773 (Utah 1995) (holding, "a genuine issue of fact material to the intent of the parties 
exists, making summary judgment on that issue improper."); Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren. 
880 P.2d 6,10 (Utah App. 1994) (holding, "Because the determination of intent is a factual 
determination, [citation omitted], the trial court erred in dismissing this claim as a matter 
2 
of lawundei '. 
The Griffins further argue that had the stricken dedicatory language meant anything, 
the city council would have removed the label "Private Lane" from the plat. However, this 
arguinciil Tails In* iiii'iWi n (In iincstioiis, v\lm did flu rifi inuih ill ilnke (lie drdicatoiy 
language and what was their intent. The removal or non-removal of "Private Lane" from the 
plat simply goes to weight of evidence. 
Also, the Griffins argue that the stricken language is meaningless because when the 
city council approved; Oak Lane as a common-use private lane. it legislated its creation 
However, rather than address the intent-issue, this argument begs the question: did the city 
council intend to approve Oak Lane as a common-use private lane? 
AccurdiugJy, l»olh (in liuil MMHI and I hi1 lirillins n i in construing inferences; from 
the factual dispute of intent in favor of the Griffins. The trial court also erred in ruling as a 
matter of law on the intent of the developers and the city council, which is inherently a 
factual dispute inappropriate for summary judgment. Itie Court should thus reverse the 
trial court's iiwunl ol ''iiiiiiiiiiah |uiljL',int'iil 
1
 Although no contract or agreement between the parties to this case-the Griffins 
and the Association-is at issue, the plat map's stricken language, which is a document 
signed by the Alpine City Council and the Developers, is at issue. Further, the Association is 
the successor-in-interest to the developers. 
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IL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER THE 1976 ORDINANCE 
APPLIED TO THE OAK HILLS HAVEN SUBDIVISION 
The Griffins attempt to distinguish the 1976 Ordinance requirement that the 
ordinance applies to subdivisions of four lots or less by arguing that based on the planning 
commission and city council's supposed approval, this requirement must have been waived. 
This argument, however, presupposes that the city council intended to approve the 
subdivision with a common-use private lane, which is the crux of the whole dispute. Thus, 
this waiver argument of the Griffins begs the question, did the city council intend to waive 
the four-lot requirement and approve the subdivision under the 1976 Ordinance, thereby 
requiring Oak Lane to be a common-use private lane. 
Because the fact that the 1976 Ordinance only applied to subdivisions of four lots or 
less, the intent of the developers and the city council must be determined by evidence 
extrinsic to the ordinance and the plat. This raises a factually sensitive dispute 
inappropriate for summary judgment. 
HL NO EVIDENCE OF A HEARING, PETITION, NOTICE, OR RECORDED 
INSTRUMENT INDICATES A PUBLIC EASEMENT EXISTS ON OAK LANE 
The Griffins attempt to distinguish Boskovich v. Midvaie Citv. 243 P.2d 435,437 
(Utah 1952) (which held that if a road is to be opened to the public, "there must be 
something more than [the] mere enactment" of an ordinance which opens the road) by 
arguing that simply because of the 1976 Ordinance which legislatively created the 
easement, the easement need not be recorded. The Griffins also point to the label "Private 
4 
Lane" on the plat which iltn claim givres notice to (lit" vvorld that an easement exists there. 
However, someone researching title to Oak Lane by reviewing the plat might also 
see the stricken dedicatory language there, as well as the four-lot requirement in the 1 -
Ordinance, and just as easily conclude tlml Jm pub!n" easenirnl ruists o\ n Oak I a -
that (lie IM76 I hdinaiki' did nol apply. 
We are thus left with the question: without a publicly-recorded easement, how is the 
world supposed to know that a public easement exists on Oak Lane without researching the 
minutes to Alpine .«•« h''/(n;ii\ rnunul ntirtings? 
flic; Griffins further attempt to distinguish Boskovich on its facts by claiming that 
the developers of the Oak Hills Haven subdivision participated in the planning and zoning 
approval process and that the developers desired to create a pi i vale larn UIKIV'T (h« 1976 
Oalifiaiii v Hi wen m if tin: devdnpers intended to have apublic easement placed on Oak 
Lane, why did some of the developers attend the January 3,1977 Alpine City Council 
meeting to "talk[]... about their private lane" which was supposedly approved before the 
planning commission enacted amoratoinutu mi DnximtHT ' IM76V hi other vmnK \\ • 
makes little sense why the developers would approach the Alpine City Council at a city 
council meeting to talk about "their private lane" if they had intended to create a public 
easement. 
Accordingly, ruisonablt1. iiiferenoes from thv Imk of an\ evidence as to a hearing, 
notice, petition or a recorded easement viewed in the light most favorable to the 
5 
Association indicates that if a public easement exists across Oak Lane, said easement 
violates Boskovich 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the Court should reverse the trial court's award of summary 
judgment to the Griffins. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 0 _day of August, 2005. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Ste^^f Qu^senberry 
J. Bryan Qu&senberry 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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